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## **Biopolitics, governmentality, and the banopticon**

In the first four chapters of this book, we have set out an extensive historical, conceptual and methodological background for our analysis of documents relating to national and international security that follows. So far, our rationale for discourse analysis has mainly addressed its structural features; yet in our view, an analysis that focuses principally on the structural features of discourse falls short of actual critique. The formal aspects of text at every level – typology, semantics, syntax, register, genre, and even 'discursive formation' - are indeed central concerns for discourse analysis. However, we would suggest that, taken alone, these features of language and discourse are not adequate to provide a theoretical framework powerful enough for us to engage critically with the language and discourse of national and international security that follows. Furthermore, structural approaches to discourse analysis tend to be generic, and universalist in their orientation. That is to say, they are proposed as being applicable to any mode of discourse, irrespective of the specific disciplinary field which it constitutes (e.g. Wodak and Meyer, 2016). For us, these more generalist, 'off-the-hook' approaches to discourse analysis fall short of providing a sufficiently radical purchase on the language and discourse of the documents relating to a particular disciplinary context, in order to reveal with a sufficient degree of specificity the relations of power which are constituted within any specialist field.

Therefore in this chapter, we introduce critical theories which are specific to the field of politics and security. However in so doing, we are going beyond the naive application of pre-existing 'grand theory'; rather, by invoking some of the more wide-ranging theoretical approaches which more usually have provenance in disciplines outside applied linguistics - such as politics and international relations, political sociology, and philosophy - we are also seeking to apply the techniques of discourse analysis to documentary evidence to shed light on how far these critical theories themselves hold up in the light of linguistic and discursive evidence. Thus, we would argue that in the current paradigm, in which synergy is sought within the social sciences between disciplines ('interdisciplinarity'), and even beyond disciplines ('post-disciplinarity'), engagement with the purely formal aspects of the discourse of a particular field can only go so far. For this book intends to speak not only to applied linguists and discourse analysis, but also to those working in international relations, the diplomatic service and even the field of the security services themselves. Therefore a critical approach to the discourse of a specialist

field should engage not only with the technical theories and methods of applied linguistics and discourse analysis, but also with critical theories which emanate from the specialist field itself.

In this chapter, we start by engaging with the later work of Michel Foucault, which extends his analysis of discourse and power into the two inter-related spheres of 'biopolitics' (1979, 2004) and 'governmentality' (2007, 2008). Foucauldian conceptualisations of these concepts have been progressed within the social sciences in two rather different directions. The first, has been carried forward by the Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005), who has proposed that governments have historically been maintaining a 'state of exception' in which recourse to the legal rights of liberal societies across Europe have been indefinitely suspended due to the prevalence of a permanent and ubiquitous condition of emergency. The second relates to the French sociologist, Didier Bigo's (2008) conceptualisation of 'illiberalism' in which he argues (contra Agamben) that a state of 'unease' is maintained within European societies, not so much by a totalising suspension of the principles of liberalism, but rather *within* liberalism through the pervasive maintenance of a condition of (in)security. In order to make sense of the documents relating to national and international security that we will analyse in subsequent chapters, we will go on in this chapter to set out the nature of these radical theories, which more usually have provenance in the fields of political philosophy and the sociology of politics.

### **Bio-power and biopolitics**

In a late interview, Michel Foucault claimed that there are 'three fundamental elements of any experience...: a game of truth, relations of power, and forms of relations to oneself and others' (1984, p. 383). These sum up the three foci of the work published during his lifetime: knowledge, power and ethics. The first two phases of his work, focusing on the constitution of disciplinary knowledge (1967, 1970, 1972, 1973) and relations of power (1977), have proved pivotal with respect to the strand of work which emerged from applied linguistics as 'critical linguistics' (e.g. Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew, 1979; Hodge & Kress, 1979) and evolved into the highly influential branch of 'critical discourse analysis' developed by Norman Fairclough and colleagues at Lancaster (1989, 1995, 2000, 2003; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). However, in his later work, Foucault synthesised these two phases into a critique of the ways in which disciplinary knowledge is articulated by governments upon their populations (1979, 2003, 2007, 2008), which has gone less recognised within the field of applied linguistics and discourse analysis.

The notion of 'bio-power' was first introduced at the end of volume one of the *History of Sexuality* (Foucault, 1979). Here, Foucault described how bio-power has come to be exercised over populations in modern societies to exercise widespread control over human life (1979, pp. 133-160). However, the concept did not resurface in his work until the posthumous publication of his lectures on 'governmentality' where the concept of bio-power evolved, within the context of a critique of the different modes of government in late modernity, into the notion of 'biopolitics' (2003, 2007, 2008). Foucault begins by tracing the emergence of bio-power back to pre-modern forms of government, which he calls 'sovereignty'. His initial focus on bio-power was upon its capacity to set limits upon life according to the modalities of different regimes. In the Middle Ages when the sovereign's own life appeared to be threatened by transgression of his laws, he retained an absolute power over the life or death of the subject. However, from the seventeenth century this medieval power over life developed into two productive, and complementary, forces: an 'anatomo-politics' of the human body which focused on the disciplinary conditioning of the body as a machine; and a 'biopolitics' of the population which focused on the biological aspects of the body in the regulation of its capacity for procreation and survival. In modern times, the feudal sovereign's power to 'take life or let live' has been replaced by the capacity of power 'to foster life or disallow it to the point of death' (Foucault, 1979, p.138). The modern correlative of the location and exercise of power at an essential, biological level is the contemporary potential for genocide, mass slaughter, and the annihilation of the human race. Thus, while in the Middle Ages death marked a transference from a terrestrial sovereignty to another more powerful one, now death is the limit of power over life.

Thus, not only did the concept of biopolitics emerge from bio-power to encapsulate the way in which the power over life is applied to populations through the practice of modern government, but biopolitics actually became established as one of the defining features of governmental *praxis*. By the eighteenth century, this political power began to focus not on 'man-as-body', as was the case with disciplinary power (1977), but upon entire populations, on '...the living man, to man-as-living-being...to man-as-species' (2003, p. 242). This realisation of biopolitics came to govern many of the conditions which underwrite the existence and the survival of the population 'from the cradle to the grave': monitoring, controlling and predicting different aspects of the population, such as the rates of births and deaths as well as the 'length of life itself'; public hygiene; maintaining the population in old age, infirmity and incapacitation; and control of the milieu in which populations live in order to prevent disease and epidemics. In order to exercise this control of the conditions of life of the population, a number of mechanisms were introduced at the end of the eighteenth century whose functions are distinct from those of disciplinary power. These include various forms of prediction - 'forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures'

- which are focused on the 'controlling of life and biological processes of man-as-species and ensuring they are...regularized'. This power of regularisation 'consists in making live and letting die' (ibid, p. 246-7). One example which brings together these techniques was the constitution of sexuality in nineteenth century Europe (Foucault, 1979). The constitution of the child as a sexual subject and the 'medicalization' of the hysterical woman were developed out of regard for the health of the race and society; while the regulation of birth control and the pathologisation of perversions gave rise to a range of disciplines such as epidemiology and psychiatry. While this bio-power was an important element in the development of capitalism, possibly more important was 'the entry of life into history,' (Foucault, 1979, p.141), a 'bio-history' in which 'methods of power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life process and undertook to control and modify them' (Foucault, 1979, p.142).

However on this argument, a paradox lies at the heart of bio-power in modernity: a form of power that is instituted in order to enable life can also be exercised in order to bring about death and annihilation (Foucault, 2003, p. 254). For Foucault, speaking towards the end of his life in the mid-1970s, this emerged from what he calls 'racism'. The paradigmatic manifestation of this in the twentieth century arose from the Nazi regime. For Nazism resurrected the archaic sovereign right of life and death over its citizens and organized it around the modern mechanisms of discipline and regulation.

The Nazi State makes the field of life it manages, protects, guarantees and cultivates in bio-political terms absolutely coextensive with the sovereign right to kill anyone...There was, in Nazism, a coincidence between a generalized biopower and a dictatorship that was at once absolute and retransmitted through the entire social body by this fantastic extension of the right to kill and of exposure to death. (ibid, p. 260)

In the twenty first century, we can once again witness that the *praxis* of security in defense of the modern state engages in novel modalities of the power 'to foster life or disallow it to the point of death' - both on the part of those who are tasked with defending liberal society, and by those who conspire to dismantle it. On the one hand, technologies of detection such as biometrics, body scanners, and iris recognition, combine with technologies of detention such as rendition and indefinite extra-territorial detention (e.g. Guantanamo Bay) and technologies of destruction such as 'smart bombs'. These enable members of the police, military and private security firms to detect, detain and destroy potential enemies at a distance; while on the other hand the human body has been constituted as a weapon that at once destroys the enemy along with its bearer. In this respect, at the turn of the last century, the recourse to bio-technology has pitted forces who 'disallow [life] to the point of death' (Foucault, 1979, p.138) against forces who embrace death to the point of auto-annihilation. One set of forces engages in the tactics of remoteness

and technical precision; the other set of forces engages in the tactics of proximity and corporeal obliteration. Both are different modalities of bio-power which are powerfully relevant not only to the practice of maintaining security in self-proclaimed liberal societies but also to its flipside, the deployment of tactics of 'terror' to disturb the complacency and dislodge the fortifications of postcolonial, liberal regimes.

### **Governmentality**

While the notion of bio-power has received some scant attention within discourse analysis, if anything, Foucault's account of the emergence of modern forms of government has been largely ignored in the field. However, the series of lectures which were gradually compiled, translated, and gradually published over the twenty years since his death (2003, 2007, 2008) have had a profound impact upon critical work in other areas of the social sciences, and particularly in their interface with politics: in international relations (e.g. Larner and Walters, 2004; Walters and Haahr, 2005), political sociology (e.g. Bigo, 2006a, 2007, 2008), political philosophy (e.g. Agamben, 1998, 2005) and most recently, security studies (e.g. Vaughan-Williams, 2017a, 2017b). In our view, it is not sufficient to assume that the 'critical' aspect of discourse analysis can become coagulated into static, and easily reproducible, 'approaches' or 'models' which can be applied across all fields of knowledge, media and everyday life; rather in keeping with other areas within the social sciences, discourse analysis has to remain fluid, progressive and innovative in order to engage with the specific conditions of language and text, not least of the emergent disciplinary formations which are being generated within late modernity. For us, Foucault's posthumously published work (2003, 2007, 2008) extends the analysis of discourse and power to address three domains of direct relevance to the documents which we will analyse later: population, government and in particular, security.

More specifically, Foucault's engagement with the 'art of government' builds on his earlier studies of 'games of truth' and 'relations of power' to provide a framework which makes it possible to examine the workings of modern European politics, and their constitution since the eighteenth century, along three lines of enquiry: according to the deployment of different modalities of knowledge for the purposes of governing the population; relating to the lines of distribution of power between institutions and agencies of government; and in keeping with the ways in which forms of relations are both constructed by government and constituted by individual subjects. Within this nexus, 'security' emerges as one strand of governmentality which can be traced through these posthumous lectures (2003, 2007, 2008). In what follows we draw on different themes which emerge from Foucault's late work in order to inform our analysis of documents produced by modern governments and their agencies as to the ways

in which power is exercised by the governments of late industrial societies upon modern populations.

With his theory of governmentality, Foucault sets out to problematize the traditional conceptualisation of the state as being essentialist and monolithic (2003, 2007, 2008). Both within realist political science and much Marxist critique, the state has conventionally been considered as a unified political entity which exercises sovereign power over its subjects. Not least with regard to national security, the state is seen as the instigator of policies enunciated by its agents who are empowered by various state ministries and offices. For modernist historians, political theorists and legislators, the state which arrived at the present form of government in the eighteenth century, has persisted worldwide up to the present day as a form of objective reality. While Foucault certainly agrees with political scientists that a rupture began to emerge within sixteenth century Europe between the absolutist medieval rule of sovereign justice and modern 'administrative' forms of government, he differs radically with respect to the ontology of the modern state. For him, the role of the state is conventionally either exaggerated as some homogenised and confrontational 'cold monster', or is reduced to an account of reproductive forces and relations of production (2007).

In order to counter these monolithic descriptions, the term 'governmentality' was adopted by Foucault to avoid describing the state as an essence, having a 'unity, individuality ... [and] rigorous functionality' (2007 p. 109). Rather, at its most conventional, governmentality is concerned with the 'mentalities of government' (Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose and Miller, 1992), or the different ways in which the 'rationalities', or the logic, of government is manifested (Dean, 2010, p. 24). Thus, the way government operates is 'explicit and embedded in language and other technical instruments...and relatively taken for granted...by its practitioners'. From this viewpoint, the authority of government is located in the shared ideas, theories and knowledges which are derived in modernity from economics and political science, and – crucially for this study - constituted through language and discourse. Moreover, as we will illustrate later in this book, the less rational 'mentalities' of government might also be drawn from the more emotive discourses of political rhetoric and the political media which circulate in the public sphere (Dean 2010, p. 25). However more crucially, governmentality also marks an expansion of the exercise of 'bio-power' that we have already explored and, as such, it provides the means to conceptualise and analyse the ways in which power is articulated upon aggregate masses of humankind through establishing rules of conduct for individual subjects (Walter, 2012, p. 15). In this respect, Foucault suggests that governmentality might be to the state 'what techniques of segregation were to psychiatry, what techniques of discipline were

to the penal system, and what biopolitics was to medical institutions' (2007, p. 120). For Foucault, governmentality is:

... the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. (2007, pp. 107-8)

### *Security*

Out of a panoply of dispersed practices, security gradually emerged to become one of the principal ways through which governmental power is exercised over populations. On Foucault's argument (2007), the 'art of government' arose in eighteenth century Europe as 'population' became fully formed, both as a concept constituted within new forms of scientific knowledge such as demographics and economics, and as the 'end and instrument' of modern forms of government. Thus, the ostensible goal of government became to ensure the well-being of the population, expressed through its health, longevity and prosperity. Through these means, 'bio-power' became exercised upon populations through the novel technology of statistics and the principal form of knowledge, political economy. The new techniques which exercise this power over populations become lodged in the 'apparatuses of security,' which operated through two arms within the modern nation state: a police force whose function is to maintain order within the population; and a 'military-technological' wing, whose function until to 1945 was to maintain a balanced distribution of territory within Europe. Broadly speaking, these constitute the historical and theoretical backdrop to what we refer to today as 'national security' and 'international security'.

However, in the exercise of power, governmentality does not so much supersede sovereignty and disciplinary power, but rather incorporates and works alongside these two techniques in regulating the expanding populations of the time. While disciplinary power, and in particular the relations between the disciplines and knowledge (Foucault 1977, 1980) have for some time informed critical discourse analysis (e.g. Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Pennycook 2001), for Foucault discipline only constitutes one of three modalities of power – discipline, sovereignty, and security – which fluctuate in their respective dominance over time. In feudal times, sovereignty was the dominant form of power through which the monarch exercised power over the subjects within his territory. This power was exercised by the judiciary and the executive through law and constitution. Disciplinary power was exercised upon individuals ('singularities'), within clearly delineated spaces such as the clinic, the barracks, the school or the prison. Thus, discipline is focused on restrictive spaces in order to regulate specific



aspects of the individual, and especially the body (Foucault 1973, 1977). By contrast, security is exercised upon entire populations ('multiplicities') within wider ranging territorial spaces such as the nation state and 'milieus' within them, such as the town. In contrast with the narrower purview of 'discipline', 'security' is expansive and laissez-faire, functioning essentially to regulate the components of 'effective reality' and the relations between them (Foucault, 2007, pp. 47).

The fundamental objective of governmentality will be mechanisms of security, or, let's say it will be state intervention with the essential function of ensuring the security of the natural phenomena of economic processes or processes intrinsic to the population. (Foucault, 2007, p. 353)

On this argument, while security is distinct from the relations of sovereign and disciplinary power, it does not supersede them. The conceptualisation of governmentality combines these three elements, but it also 'departs from them and seeks to reinscribe and recode them' (Dean 2010, p. 29).

Within this nexus, a central purpose of these new mechanisms of security was to maintain the developing relations between state forces across Europe. From the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century, the economy emerged as a semi-autonomous force which was constitutive of, and differentiated between, nation states. This led to the setting up of competitive relations between the newly emerging European nations: 'manipulating, distributing, and re-establishing relations of force within a space of competition that entails competitive growths' (Foucault, 2007, p. 312). Two 'assemblages of political technology' were required in order to maintain this 'field of relations of forces' between nation states: on the one hand, what we have come to know as the 'police'; and, on the other hand, a diplomatic corps and a professional army. The police is the agency we most often associate with regulating order within the state; however, historically its role has changed since its inception in the sixteenth century Europe (ibid, pp. 311- 328). In its earliest manifestation, the police was not an organisation comprising a uniformed constabulary charged with keeping the peace. Rather, it was a type of community association which was managed by the public authorities. While the precise nature of the police in the early seventeenth century differed across Europe, its central goal is to take responsibility for the activity of the population in as much as it 'constitutes a differential element in the development of the state's forces' (ibid, p. 322). There were two conditions which underwrote the emergence of the police in its pre-modern form. First was the urbanisation of the territory of the nation state, inasmuch as it became organised around emerging market towns. The second, and more fundamental

condition, was the development of commerce and the maximisation of profit as a key principle of governmental rationality (ibid, pp. 337-339). To achieve this, prototypical police forces across Europe performed five central functions, which we would associate today more with the delivery of public welfare rather than maintenance of public order: controlling the number of the population in relation to the territory they occupied; ensuring the provision of basic needs and sustenance for families; maintaining public health; ensuring that each member of the population was gainfully employed; and making sure that the infrastructure of each region was in a good enough shape to allow goods and products to move around the region. Thus, the job of this prototypical police force was not just to ensure the well-being of the citizens of the state, but also to 'convert' this well-being into the 'constitution and development of the state's forces' (ibid, p. 328).

However, the beginning of the eighteenth century saw a radical shift in the police's role, which begins to anticipate the function of the modern security services. This reflected a change in thinking about the economy, which was moving much more towards something like the 'free market' which we experience today. Rather than the well-ordered society which was the goal of rulers from the Middle Ages up to the seventeenth century, in eighteenth century Europe two forces emerged within the state – population and the economy. Both of these appeared to have their own momentum, behaving according to their own laws and becoming the object of the new scientific disciplines of medicine and economics. Thus, the role of the state and its force was no longer the regulation of commerce and the population, but rather to permit these forces the freedom to find their own level in systems that were thought to be self-correcting.

The fundamental objective of governmentality will be mechanisms of security, or, let's say, it will be state intervention with the essential function of ensuring security of the natural phenomena of economic processes or processes intrinsic to the population. (2007, p. 353)

On this argument, management of the population and the economy was transferred from the pre-modern police force to other government agencies which were charged with 'increasing the forces of the state', and the police took on the role we are familiar with today, of 'ensuring the prevention or repression of disorder, irregularity, illegality, and delinquency' (ibid, p. 353). However, more importantly, the police also became the apparatus which enforces 'a legal system of respect for freedoms' (ibid, p. 354) which anticipates one of the paradoxes of liberalism which we will encounter later in this chapter.

As well as the police, the second arm of the security mechanism of nascent modern governments was 'the military-diplomatic apparatus' (2007, pp. 296-306). This comprised

three instruments of security: a permanent diplomatic corps, standing armies and supra-national diplomatic organisations. From the sixteenth century, these were set up in order to maintain what we now call 'international security' across European states as a result of the change in the dynamics of power that took place as emerging nation states consolidated across the Continent. The first aspect of this shift lay in the supersession of the recurring dream of medieval times to unify the diverse regions, cities and sovereign states into one, integrated imperial Europe. The pivotal event here was the Treaty of Westphalia which took place in 1648, bringing to an end the Thirty Years' War and establishing the principle of the peaceful co-existence of sovereign states across Europe. But if the principle of Europe from the late seventeenth century onwards was articulated in terms of the express desire for an absence of war, it remained 'a space of political and economic competition', as revealed by the dramatic expansion and contraction of the Spanish Empire between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The second aspect of this transition arose from the collapse of the three constituents of the dynastic power of the medieval prince, on the basis of which relations with other countries, regions or territories had been negotiated: the prince's personal wealth, the extent of his territories, and his alliances through family relationship or marital liaison. From the second half of the seventeenth century, competition between states was instead realized through a 'politics whose principal objective will be the employment and constitution of forces' made up of the 'wealth' of states, the 'resources' of states, and above all states' 'force' (p. 295).

The emerging relations between state forces across Europe required the development of a mechanism of security to maintain them. First, war could be waged by one state against another in order to maintain the mutual balance of power. Second, standing armies were established that for the first time enabled soldiery to be constituted as a professional career, national infrastructures of fortifications and transportation were constructed, and a science of warfare was founded. Third, the practice of diplomacy came to be exercised through the reciprocal establishment of diplomatic embassies which represented each country across the European states; as well as the setting up of legally underwritten consultative organisations, in particular cities, in order to bring together diplomatic representatives from each state. These three facets of security will emerge in different ways from the corpora of security documents which we will analyse later. Not least will be the way in which the function of the military is seen to blend with the police and private security firms (after, Bigo, 2008) in the protection of the sports mega-events which have become such potent symbols of the wealth, artistic imagination and prowess of the host nation. And the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), from which we draw our corpus of documents in Chapter 9, purportedly represents the post-

Westphalian supra-national organisation *par excellence*, committed to maintaining the peace not just across Europe but also around the world.

Both the police and the military-diplomatic assemblage required a means of gathering and processing information relating not only to the population of the state and its own 'forces', but also to the 'forces' of other states. This led to the advent of statistics, a term which originally meant 'science of the state' (2007, p. 101). This new way of analyzing knowledge emerged in sixteenth century Europe and was consolidated in the seventeenth in parallel with the shift in the inter-state relations. The use of statistics began as an administrative tool and became used increasingly as a means of analyzing the population. Through the seventeenth century 'population' increasingly became the object of government as it was seen, like the economy, to be operating according to its own laws. Statistics emerged as an instrument of the art of government in order to calculate the trajectory of diseases, analyse trends in mortality, gauge the productivity of labour, and calculate the wealth of regions as well as the entire nation. In this way, statistics came to be used as a technique and form of knowledge that enabled links to be made between the analysis of the population and the analysis of the economy (2007, pp. 104, 274). However, statistics did not only emerge as a technique of knowledge that operated within the state; from the seventeenth century on they were also mobilized to maintain relations between the states within Europe. On Foucault's argument, statistical knowledge was necessary to maintain a balance of power ('equilibrium') between European states through each state's knowledge not only of its own capacity ('force'), but also those ('forces') of other rival states. This statistical knowledge was maintained across Europe by the prototypical police force described above.

Police makes statistics necessary, but police also makes statistics possible. For it is precisely the whole set of measures set up to increase, combine, and develop forces, it is this whole administrative assemblage that makes it possible to identify what each state's forces comprise and their possibilities of development. Police and statistics mutually condition each other, and statistics is a common instrument between police and the European equilibrium. (2007, p. 315)

However, as we shall see, in the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> century the roles of the various agencies in Europe concerned with security – police, military, private security companies - start to become less well delineated (Bigo, 2008; see also Chapter 8); and in Chapter 10 we will examine discursive evidence that this 'de-differentiation' of forces may well apply, not just to agencies which operate within European states, but also to the re-constitution of the security services within the United States in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

## State of exception

So far in this chapter, we have argued that an understanding of bio-power, biopolitics and the tactics of government developed by Foucault throughout his later work (1979, 2003, 2007, 2008) is necessary to inform a critical reading of documents which make up the contemporary discourse of national and international security. However, Foucault's account has been both challenged and extended by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, with his argument both for the politicisation of 'bare life' (1998) and his contention that, since the nineteenth century, a considerably less dispersed mode of government has emerged in Europe and North America, a form of government for which – contra liberalism – the permanent suspension of civil rights and *habeas corpus* has become the norm in the face of a (purported) continuing state of emergency (2005).

Although Foucault's (1979, 2003) conceptualisation of bio-power and biopolitics was situated within an expansive historical terrain, Giorgio Agamben has argued that his approach only adopted a singular notion of life which, if we go back as far back as Classical Greece, has been expressed in a more variegated way (1998). Agamben suggests that in fact two discrete terms – *zōē* and *bios* – were used by the Ancient Greeks to distinguish between different modes of life. *Zōē* indicates the basic condition of being alive which is experienced by all animate beings, animal or human; *bios* refers to 'the form of living proper to an individual or a group' which characterises human sociality, and in particular the engagement of the citizen in political life (Mills, 2008, p. 64). Evidence for this distinction comes from Aristotle's *Politics* (in Agamben, 1998, pp. 1-2), where the Ancient Greek philosopher opposes the natural state of reproduction and sustenance which is circumscribed within the home (*oikos*) to participation in the social and political life of the city state (*polis*) (ibid p. 2). Agamben acknowledges that Foucault alluded to this distinction (1979); however, he himself views this feature as being a defining moment, not just of biopolitics, but also of modern societies from the eighteenth century up to the present: '... the entry of *zōē* into the sphere of the polis – the politicisation of bare life as such – constitutes the decisive event of modernity' (ibid., p. 4).

In our view, there are few spheres of modern existence in which this 'politicisation of bare life' takes place more forcefully than in the maintenance of the security of the population of the state; and, indeed to understand this, it is necessary to engage with the ways in which forms of 'bare life' are constituted within the language and discourse of security. Foucault describes power as operating along two lines: the use of political techniques for the state to control the natural life of the population, aided and abetted by the police; and through 'technologies of the self', whereby the subject carries out processes of subjectification which create a sense of

self while simultaneously being influenced by governmental forces (Agamben, 1998, p. 5; Foucault, 1994, pp. 229-32). It is precisely with this separation between the 'juridico-institutional' and the 'bio-political' models of power that Agamben takes issue, arguing that, in fact, 'bare life' (*zōē*) has always been included in 'political life' (*bios*). For him it is in political life that the original 'nucleus of sovereign power' lies. Agamben goes on to state emphatically that the 'production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power' (ibid, p. 6). Implicit in this is the view that, contra Foucault's argument for the dispersal of governmental power throughout the modern state, power remains localised in the domain of the sovereign: either literally – as in most European states up to the end of the nineteenth century, the Third Reich, and many totalitarian and 'post-totalitarian' states from Stalin to Putin; or figuratively as in the 'spectacular' pseudo-democracies of present day post-industrial societies (e.g. Debord, 1967; Kellner, 2005).

Starting with Carl Schmitt's (in)famous definition– 'the sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception' (Schmitt, 2005/1922) – Agamben goes on to set out two aporias which lie at the heart of sovereignty and sovereign power (1998, 2005). The first is the more fundamental juridical paradox which underpins the positioning of the sovereign within a constitutional legal framework. On the one hand the sovereign, per se, is legally entitled to bring about a total suspension of the law; however, once the constitution is suspended, the sovereign himself becomes placed beyond the juridical system. In this respect, 'the sovereign, having the legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law' (Agamben, 1998, p. 15). In fact, the sovereign is simultaneously and aporetically placed both inside and outside the legal system. However the exceptional position of the sovereign is a double paradox, in as much as, while the state of exception marks a 'kind of exclusion' in which the individual rule is not included in the general, nevertheless the moment of exclusion simultaneously references the rule from which it is excluded: 'what is excluded in the exception maintains itself in relation to the rule in the form of the rule's suspension' (ibid, pp. 17-8). In fact, Schmitt himself argued that it is the exception to the rule that upholds the rule more decisively than the rule itself (1985/1922, pp. 19-22). Agamben dubs this relation the 'ban', by adopting from Jean-Luc Nancy (1983) an Old Germanic term that means at once exclusion from the community at the decree of the sovereign. He who is banned, or 'abandoned', is like the sovereign at the moment of exclusion, at once 'outside and inside the juridical order' (ibid, pp. 28-9), in an aporetic state of 'inclusion/exclusion' (Agamben, 1998; Vogt in Norris, 2005, p. 79; Prozorov, 2014, pp. 97-98).

Building on this argument, this condition of 'exceptionalism' can also be used as a 'paradigm of government' in which there is an ambivalence between the articulation of law and politics within the state (Agamben, 2005, pp. 2-4). The governmental form of this 'state of exception' is closely related to abnormal conditions that arise within the nation state, such as a civil war or an uprising. The equivocal nature of this state of government is suggested by the fact that these conditions are called very different things in different languages. In English, these conditions are referred to as 'martial law' or 'emergency powers'; the French term 'état de siège' can be translated as 'state of siege', while the original words used in German are 'Ausnahmezustand' or 'Notstand' which are broadly equivalent to 'state of necessity' (after Schmitt, 1922/1985). It was the claim for conditions such as these that underwrote the suspension of the constitution when the National Socialist Party came to power in Germany in 1933. This meant that the twelve-year period of the Third Reich can effectively be seen as a continuous state of exception. And, arguably, since the world has been engaged in a 'global civil war' ever since (Arendt, in Agamben, 2005, p. 3; Schmitt, in Agamben, 2005, p. 3), which has given rise to a widespread and enduring state of exception, 'as a threshold of indeterminacy between absolutism and democracy' (ibid, p. 3).

The focus of Agamben's genealogical enquiry in *State of Exception* (2005) is to examine a wide range of claims by constitutional writers from different European countries as to whether this eponymous state of affairs is regulated by the constitution or by law, or whether it is a political act of expediency which persists unchecked. As with language, Agamben suggests that this differs according to national context: a more juridical approach is favoured by France and Germany; whereas Italy, Switzerland, the UK and USA tend to take a more pragmatic, political, line (ibid, p. 10). In our later analysis of documentary evidence relating to the constitution of a contemporary state of exception, we seek to bring our own interpretation of the rhetorical and semantic features of the contemporary discourse of security discourse to further illuminate this issue. However, Agamben argues that a simple dichotomy between legal and political, constitutional and pragmatic, internal and external ('inside/outside') fails to provide an adequate explanation of the basis of exception as a state of government. Rather:

...the problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other. The suspension of the norm does not mean its abolition, and the zone of anomie that it enables is not...unrelated to the juridical order. (ibid, 23)

A central issue which Agamben addresses is the locus of the suspension of the norm, or 'the meaning, place and modes of its relation to the law' (2005, p. 51). In particular, he considers

the question of whether the sovereign power that is entailed by this suspension can become invested in a single body, such as 'Emperor', 'Dictator', *Duce*, *Führer*, 'Revolutionary Council' or 'President'. The genealogical line takes us back to Ancient Rome, where in circumstances of a *tumultus* (or 'emergency situation') the State could proclaim a *iustitium*, or 'suspension of the law' (ibid, p. 41-2). Although it has been suggested that, as with totalitarian regimes of more recent times, the *iustitium* too was a 'dictatorship', this appears a less than adequate explanation; for the state of exception is 'a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations...are deactivated' (ibid, p. 50). For Agamben, it is a 'force of law without law' (ibid, p. 39) which negates any recourse to juridical appraisal of acts carried out during the emergency situation (ibid, p. 50). Furthermore, he dismisses as 'fiction' the arguments of those twentieth century scholars who, writing in the shadow of Fascism, claimed that the source of power within the state of exception resided in the figure of the dictator. Rather, for Agamben, the 'secret of power' is impersonal, and resides in the dialectic between the 'normative and juridical' (dubbed *potestas* in Ancient Rome) and the 'anomic and metajuridical' (*auctoritas*):

The state of exception is the device that must ultimately articulate and hold together the two aspects of the juridical-political machine by initiating a threshold of indecidability between anomie and *nomos*, between life and law, between *auctoritas* and *potestas*. (ibid, p. 86)

However according to Agamben, the state of exception is not just some relic of ancient sophistry, but has become on this account - broadly speaking since the First World War - the defining condition of the modern state. On Agamben's argument, the 'juridically empty' space of the state of exception, having once been contained within the structure of the state, is now expanding to occupy the space of the entire global polis:

...the coming to light of the state of exception as the preeminent structure of juridico-political de-localization and dis-location. Political organization is not regressing toward outdated form; rather premonitory events are, like bloody masses, announcing the new *nomos* of the earth, which ...will soon extend itself over the entire planet (1998, p. 38).

Getting closer to our central concerns, it is possible that just such a 'premonitory event' took place on 11 September, 2001 when – as we have described in Chapter 2 - a radical Islamist organisation launched a deadly attack upon the most militarised country in the world, commandeering commercial aircraft to slowly demolish one of the pre-eminent symbols of global capitalism and kill almost three thousand civilians in a spectacle transmitted in real time across the world's media channels (Kellner, 2005). The subsequent passing of the USA



PATRIOT Act on 26 October, and the decreeing of the 'military order' by George W. Bush on 13 November, issued in – for Agamben and, as we saw in Chapter 3, many of those working in critical discourse analysis - the most far-reaching state of exception initiated by a modern state since the Third Reich. The first edict brought into play 'indefinite detention' and trial by 'military commissions' of those who did not hold US citizenship and were suspected of being involved in terrorist activities. The second piece of legislation authorised the US Attorney General to 'take into custody any foreigner who it was believed was engaged in activities that were a danger to 'the national security of the United States'. What is unique about this decree is that it 'radically erases any legal basis of the individual, thus producing a legally unnameable and unclassifiable thing' (Agamben, 2005, p. 3). The prisoners who were captured in Afghanistan did not have the status of a prisoner of war as laid down by the Geneva Convention, nor were they judged guilty of any criminal act according to domestic law. They were merely 'detainees', the 'object' of a detention that is 'indefinite' both in terms of it lasting for no demonstrable length of time and in terms of it having no recognisable juridical or legal basis.

### **The management of unease**

Foucault's theories of biopower, governmentality and biopolitics emerged from his close reading of documentary evidence relating to madness, illness, criminality and latterly politics, and Agamben's conceptualisations of 'bare life' and 'exceptionalism' are grounded on his study of legal history from Ancient Greece to nineteenth and twentieth century European states; however, we conclude this chapter by engaging with a theorisation of the practice of contemporary security, which perhaps comes closer to the techniques of discourse analysis in being rather more transparently grounded in an empirical approach. For the French sociologist Didier Bigo – along with colleagues who comprise the 'Paris School' of security studies, for us most notably Elspeth Guild (e.g. Bigo, Carrera, Guild & Walker, 2010; Bigo, Carrera & Guild, 2012) and Anastassia Tsoukala (e.g. Bigo & Tsoukala, 2006, 2008) - have drawn on concepts from Foucault and Agamben such as 'biopolitics' and 'ban', as well as the concept of 'field' originally developed by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1972, 1980), to frame a number of wide ranging research projects into migration and 'bordering practices' within the European Union. These have implications for the practice of security, and the in our view more specifically for the discourse of security. Along with other scholars who work outside philosophy in the more empirically oriented disciplines of sociology, political science and international relations (e.g. Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2004; Huysmans, 2004), Bigo does not entirely go along with Agamben's idiosyncratic interpretation of bio-power and biopolitics, and his claims for the exorbitant nature of sovereign power in contemporary societies.

### *Liberalism within liberalism*

As we have seen, the historical pivot of Agamben's most recent claim for a radical intensification of sovereign power (2005) is the declaration of a state of emergency in the USA which immediately followed the 9/11 attacks. Bigo argues from a rather wider international purview to assert that the fall-out from this declaration was less radical than is often asserted. There are two bases for his contention: first, that the state of emergency was in fact not that widespread internationally, and therefore it is not justifiable only to select the USA as the paradigmatic case; and secondly that, in any case, the declaration of a state of emergency did not so much radically alter the legal basis of the constitution, but rather intensified already existing systems of surveillance (Bigo, 2006a).

In fact, three countries formally declared a state of emergency in the wake of 9/11: the USA, UK and Australia. Within the USA, the state of emergency was used to justify the war against Iraq, along with a simultaneous 'militarization of internal security, an enlargement of the role of external intelligence services inside, and a downsizing of the role of the role of police, judges, parliament, and international agreements' (2006a, p. 48). However, Bigo goes on to argue that in the UK the state of emergency was used merely to support 'limited derogations' from existing legislation; while in Australia it was tied much more to a local debate over national identity. Furthermore, the decision of the USA, UK and their allies to invade Iraq without a formal UN agreement alienated many European countries such as Germany, France and Belgium. On this argument, the US attacks provided a pretext across Europe for the intensification of already existing surveillance measures, the criminalisation of migrants, fundamentalists and underground organisations, as well as the introduction of new measures such as indefinite detention and biometric identification. Further afield, other continents went largely unaffected by the crisis in the North. Within the Arab world, even Saudi Arabia – the most notable ally of the USA and the UK – did not radically adjust what was already operationally quite an astringent regime of internal security. Moreover, the other two powerful members of the UN Security Council of a different political hue from the USA - China and Russia - remained more preoccupied with their own international security tensions for the US attacks to have much impact upon their security practices. For Bigo, therefore:

The idea of September 11 as an exceptional event of violence, as 'hyper terrorism' has to be replaced by the one of September 11, 2001, Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005 as a series of intensive bombings of varied intensity followed by a backlash to archaic visions of exceptionalism as a solution, either by war or by the dream of a global control of all the individual's on the move around the planet. (2006a, p. 49)

This interpretation of events also speaks to a wider global purview, where India also remains preoccupied with its own regional security concerns; and many countries in Africa remain enmired within their own postcolonial internecine conflicts, and often are simply preoccupied with the struggle to achieve the most basic indicators of economic self-sufficiency.

### *Professional field*

The Paris School also dispute Agamben's claims (1998, 2005) that there is a coherent strategy of domination by the sovereign state and its agents (after earlier twentieth century political philosophers such as Carl Schmitt, 2005/1922). This is particularly the case with regard to Agamben's distinction between a police force which is charged with the maintenance of external society; and a military which is charged with the maintenance of external security. Part of the challenge to the coherence of this thesis has been brought about by the more recent problematisation of what lies inside and what lies outside the borders of a particular territory (e.g. Walker, 1993; Vaughan-Williams, 2012). To a large extent, the material borders between nation states have been superseded (if indeed they ever really did act as meaningful barriers to ingress and egress from a particular territory) and the management of these borders is carried out by a panoply of technologies which often take place at some distance from the actual geographic boundaries themselves (Bigo, 2005a, 2006b, 2014; Bigo, Bonelli, Chi & Olsson, 2007). These include 'fingerprinting, biometric identifiers, forge-proof IDs, computerised tracking of entrance, residence, accommodation and exit, setting up expert IT systems, satellite surveillance, ... enlarged data-storage' (2006b, p. 414); as well as, more recently, profiling and predictive data analysis (Bigo, 2010a). This has been further intensified by the rhetoric generated by the USA and its allies relating to the need to carry out a security operation which is global in scale and intensity (Bigo, 2008, p. 10). Bigo contends that this has brought about a "'field" of professionals of the management of unease' within which there is a 'dedifferentiation' of the roles of the police and the military.

This emergent field of the management of unease explains, on the one hand, the formation of police networks at the global level, as well as the policiarization of military function of combat and, on the other hand, the transformation, the criminalization and the juridicalization of the notion of war. (ibid, p. 10)

In our view, this globalisation of security is marked by a heterogeneity of strategies, tactics and interests on the part of different actors, which although it extends it, is much more compatible with the framework of governmentality set out above (after Foucault, 2007, 2008), rather than the totalising power of the sovereign state.

Over the years (e.g. 2005b, 2007, 2014), Bigo has developed a framework for describing a 'field of (in)security professionals' which consists of four dimensions (2008, pp. 22 ff.). The function of this field relates directly to the analysis of security discourse, not least since it 'depends on the capacity of agents to *produce statements on unease* and present solutions to facilitate the management of unease' (ibid, p. 23, our emphasis). First, the field functions as a 'field of forces', akin to a magnetic field. This refers to a certain tendency towards homogenisation within the field of '(in)security'. Here, although intelligence might be gathered from a number of different sources, it is in the interests of agents to develop convergent perceptions of who their adversary is and what constitutes legitimate knowledge of their foe. Secondly, the field also functions as a 'field of struggles'. Because of its tendency towards convergence, the field is characterised by competition between different agents to claim ownership of, or 'colonise', different areas of activity such as anti-terrorist surveillance or the monitoring of particular flows of transnational migration, as in the case of the recent Syrian Civil War. This extends to rivalry between different agencies such as the police, military and their 'intermediaries' over what constitutes 'security', and who has the legitimacy to 'designate' a threat (after Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, 1998). This then relates, in turn, to the way in which the field of security operates as a 'field of domination' in relation to other fields. Agents working in the field of security are assertive of their different rights to declare what constitutes a security threat, rather than those working in other fields such as that of politics - however much the latter might wish to have the last say on security matters. The UK's MI5 and MI6, or the FBI and CIA in America, also compete for access to resources and the attention of politicians and the media. And, as we shall see from our analysis of some of the latter agencies' webpages in Chapter 9, the significant reconfiguration of security agencies, which took place in the USA under the aegis of the Department of Homeland Security in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, involved considerable restructuring of relations and jostling for position between different security actors. The security field is further complicated as it extends from public bureaucracies to the private sector, and particularly – as we shall see in Chapter 8, in the UK - private security firms. However, despite the intersubjective constitution of the security field, it does have certain boundaries which go beyond mere subjectivity. While these boundaries are always on the move in line with the interests of diverse agents, groups of agents and different agencies, they have their own dynamic which is both internal and external as they also maintain relationships with other fields. Thus, the security field is a bounded field (ibid, p. 26): '...the boundaries of the field are framing the doxa of the agents and, then, tend to reproduce the same figuration and to adjust the habitus of the agents along the previous figuration' (after Bourdieu, 1972, 1980; Elias, 1994).

Finally, we have already noted that the borders of the nation state have become dematerialized and fluid, superseding the traditional notion of a fixed physical boundary and rendering opaque the distinction between what takes place 'inside' and 'outside' the sovereign territory (Walker, 1993). For Bigo, it is the space that exists beyond national boundaries, but is not yet delimited by a larger supranational entity such as the European Union, that 'characterizes the relationship between agents' of the security field. In this respect, the field can neither be reduced to a national, bi-national or supranational level, but rather operates within a space that exists between and across these levels. This social space comprises different agencies which operate in spaces which are differentiated not only according to territory (e.g. local vs. national police) and by function (e.g. border controls vs. intelligence agencies) but also by their transnational networks of relations (ibid., p. 28; see also 2007). In this respect, the security field is also a 'traversal' field, inasmuch as its agents occupy the interstitial space that opens up across and between different territorial levels.

### *Banopticon*

The features that we have outlined so far in this section – exceptionalism, the 'field of professionals of (un)ease management', and normalisation of the freedom of movement, coalesce for Bigo in a framework concept he has called the 'banopticon' (2005b, 2006a, 2007, 2008). Here, he synthesises two concepts which we have already encountered. The idea of 'ban' was incorporated by Giorgio Agamben (1998) from Jean-Luc Nancy (1983) to refer to the combined ideas of 'exclusion from the community' and 'insignia of the sovereign'. While Agamben uses the term to emphasise the exercise of sovereign power in the 'framing' of exception, Bigo recalibrates it in order to stress the trajectory of exclusion which is accomplished through the routine, bottom-up practices of security actors, rather than the congealed, top-down power of the notional sovereign (Bigo et al, 2007, p. 11). Foucault's (1977) 'paradigm' of the panopticon is already well known; and here, the root '-opticon' once again conveys the notion of observation. However, if the panopticon conveys the idea of surveillance of the many – as in the 'surveillance society', the banopticon involves the surveillance of the few. Its function is to identify those who should be denied access to, detained or expelled from the sovereign territory, in order to distinguish them from the bulk of the population to whom the right to access or to 'freely' inhabit a particular territory is extended. Both the panopticon and the banopticon therefore exercise a normative function; but while the former is inclusive and extensive in its scope, the latter is exclusive and parsimonious. On our reading, the banopticon - or, drawing even more squarely on Foucault, the 'banoptic dispositif'

(2008, p. 31) - is a metonym which encapsulates the exercise of exclusion (and inclusion) in post-industrial societies through surveillance monitoring and 'bordering practices'.

This formulation... allows us to understand how a network of heterogeneous and transversal practices functions and makes sense as a form of (in)security at the transnational level. It allows us to analyse the collection of heterogeneous bodies of discourses..., of institutions..., of architectural structures, ...of laws..., and of administrative measures.... (Bigo, 2008, p. 32)

Thus, the banopticon operates not as some unitary extension of the panopticon on a global scale, but rather as a dispersed and heterogeneous network of inter-agency co-operation and transnational collaboration.

The banopticon yokes together three 'dimensions' of security practices: exceptionalism, exclusion, and normalisation (Bigo, 2008, pp. 31-36). As we have noted, shortly after 9/11 the US and the UK put in place exceptional legal measures through the US PATRIOT Act (2001) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005), which limited the juridical rights of both temporary residents and citizens. Agamben (1998, 2005) has focused upon the exclusively legal implications of this in order to posit an all-encompassing 'state of exception' which unleashes an overwhelming 'sovereign power'. By contrast, Bigo (2008) offers a more nuanced account of exceptionalism in which the extra-judicial measures initiated by the US and its allies operate within a constitutional context combining liberalism with the 'routinized dispositif of technologies of control and surveillance' (p. 33). On this argument, exceptionalism is not seen as a totalising regime, but rather as a situation where extra-judicial legislation and the invention of novel spaces of detention (paradigmatically, the 'camp' at Guantanamo Bay) simply 'derogate' from a state of affairs that nevertheless maintains within an essentially liberal regime. Thus, for Bigo, the particular modality of exceptionalism that has been brought into play since 9/11 can be designated as 'illiberal practices at the heart of liberalism' (2008, p. 35) or, rather more snappily: the 'illiberal practices of liberal regimes' (2008, p. 2). The second dimension of the banopticon is the identification of categories of individual who appear to be undesirable and their denial of access to, detention, or expulsion from a particular territory or state. To achieve this, modern computer technologies and biometrics are used to collect, collate and analyse data from a wide range of public, private and police sources in order to construct profiles of potentially risky individuals or groups (Bigo et al., 2007). This entails the normalisation of the behaviour of groups of people through pro-active analysis and prediction (Bigo 2006a, pp. 58-63). Thirdly, this 'criterion' of normalisation arises principally from the 'imperative of free movement' across modern, globalised societies, a phenomenon which is set out more explicitly within the European Union than North America. For Bigo, this

imperative does not arise from a dichotomy between those who are permitted access to mobility and those to whom it is denied; rather it becomes a touchstone for the normalisation of the majority of the population, and a focus on the surveillance of a minority (2008, p. 36).

Most recently, this has led to a conflation of mobility with the idea of freedom in the Eurozone and elsewhere. Ironically, it is no longer those who are detained or who are denied free access to nation states across Europe who are subjected to monitoring and surveillance; rather, the continual desire for mobility, comfort and speed on the part of global elites also leads to travellers being monitored through predictive data analysis and the proliferation of smart technologies at virtual borders (Bigo, 2010a; 2010b, pp. 410-413).

## **Conclusion**

The various disciplines that we have drawn on in these initial chapters - philosophy and law, sociology, political science and international relations, as well as our own pursuit of discourse analysis - all engage differently with how words and language make sense of the social and political world. Many of the differences between the universes constructed within these disciplines arise not only from the various ways in which language is interpreted through their diverse disciplinary lenses, but also from the numerous techniques whereby it is possible to marshal 'evidence' for different disciplinary purposes. Thus Agamben's 'legal philosophy' (or philosophy of the law) tends to pursue a methodology which is more inclined towards the postulation of more absolutist, atemporal constructs such as 'bare life' (1998); whereas Bigo's political sociology is inclined towards more synthetic conclusions such as the different trajectories of the 'professionals of (un)ease management' and the 'banopticon' (2008).

In the chapters that follow, we will engage in the scrutiny of contemporary documents which we have harvested from a range of national and international organisations tasked with the maintenance of national and international security. Given that in this enterprise, discourse analysis perhaps has most disciplinary affinity with sociology, on a theoretical level we tend to veer towards Bigo's argument that exceptionalism within late capitalist societies is 'linked with a specific form of governmentality' (2006a, p. 47); that rather than becoming an absolute state of affairs, the conditions of 'emergency' are by and large moderated by the liberal constitutions that prevail within the North. Furthermore, we share the scepticism of many commentators as to whether the nadir of 'bare life' has ever actually been realised by modern societies (Bigo et al., 2007, p. 12; Laclau, 2007, p. 19). However with Bigo, we remain informed particularly by the way in which Agamben perpetuates the broader implications of bio-power and biopolitics (Agamben, 1998; Foucault 1979, 2003). Therefore, the ideas and theories presented in this

chapter have formed a necessary conceptual backdrop to the empirical investigations that follow. In the next four chapters, we interrogate a number of corpora of texts produced by governments, supranational organisations and security agencies in order to explore some of the ways in which language and discourse is deployed to constitute the *praxis* of security in modern societies.

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